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Abstract  
 This study investigates the effect of an environmental regulation on the innovation 
choice of firms in an oligopoly. Most existing studies on environmental regulations and 
innovations examine the optimal behavior of firms when one innovation project is 
feasible. In our model, firms are allowed to choose from multiple types of innovation 
projects. Our main contributions are that we derive the conditions under which 
environmentally friendly and cost reducing innovations are selected in Bertrand 
competition and we show how environmental regulation affects innovation choice. 
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1. Introduction 
 Environmental issues are increasing and resolving these has been a major social 
challenge in recent years. On the other hand, the introduction of regulations that aims 
to resolve such issues would incur additional cost to firms and reduce their profits. In 
general, the relationship between firms’ profit and environmental burden reduction is 
considered to be a trade-off. Therefore, many studies assert that it is difficult to realize 
simultaneously an increase in firms’ profit and a reduction of environmental burden. By 
contrast, the Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995) asserts 
that under strict environmental regulation, firms would accelerate innovations and 
could increase their profits.  
Given that the Porter hypothesis suggests the possibility of compatibility between 
environmental protection and economic development, many studies, such as Palmer et 
al. (1995), are skeptical because the hypothesis has some contradictions in terms of the 
rational behavior of firms. For example, if firms can increase their profits by innovation, 
profit-maximizing firms are supposed to implement the innovation without an 
environmental regulation. Therefore, the Porter hypothesis cannot explain why 
environmental regulations are needed to implement the innovation. Beyond that, this 
hypothesis presents nothing more than some success examples.  
On the other hand, some recent studies analyze the conditions under which the Porter 
hypothesis is supported (Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw, 1999; Schmutzler, 2001; Ambec and 
Barla, 2002; Feichtinger et al., 2005; André et al., 2009). Most existing studies that 
examine the Porter hypothesis assume that firms have only one type of innovation 
project and that these firms decide the level of investment in the project to maximize 
their expected profits: that is, the innovation itself is given in those studies. However, to 
improve the generality of the analysis, we have to demonstrate why an innovation 
project is selected. In practice, firms have multiple innovation projects from among 
which they choose one. In addition, they might decide not to implement any of these 
projects; that is, firms choose the status quo. This situation will arise when the expected 
profit after conducting innovation is smaller than the initial profit. Therefore, in this 
study, we introduce situations in which firms have multiple innovation projects. 
Furthermore, this study includes the case where firms decide not to implement any 
project.  
In existing studies, the type of innovation varies. For example, Innes and Bial (2002) 
employed the innovation (Research and Development project) that lowers the pollution 
abatement cost; Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999), Schmutzler (2001), Ambec and Barla 
(2002), and Feichtinger et al. (2005) employed the notion that newer technologies (or 
machines) are less polluting. Bonato and Schmutzler (2000) analyzed three types of 
innovations. Their innovations consist of: (1) pure cost reducing innovation, (2) pure 
environmental innovation, and (3) environmental innovation with cost reducing effects. 
Bonato and Schmutzler (2002) examined the firm’s choice of an innovation under the 
setting of a fixed output level and price. Although this study also analyzes the choice of 
an innovation, we introduce the effect of strategic interdependence between firms into 
our model. 
In the next place, the innovation’s success or failure is generally uncertain in 
advance. Although environmental innovation with cost reducing effects is adopted in 
many existing studies (Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw, 1999; Schmutzler, 2001; Bonato and 
Schmutzler, 2002), reducing environmental burden might not always accompany the 
cost-reducing effect. Therefore, we introduce this uncertainty into our analysis. We 
assume that reducing environmental burden does not always accompany the cost 
reducing effect but the effect will stochastically generate. Introducing this uncertainty 
would extend the generality of the analysis. 
  
 2. The model 
 We consider a homogeneous duopoly market, in which two firms engage in a Bertrand 
competition. Both firms produce the same good with a common marginal cost ,c  and 
their production activities generate environmental burden .HD  Each firm i  ( 1,2)i   
simultaneously chooses one innovation project from among three. The three projects are 
,X  ,Y  and .N  
Innovation project X  reduces the marginal cost from c  to xc  ( 0xc c  ). 
Innovation project Y  reduces the environmental burden from HD  to LD
( 0H LD D  ). Generally, innovation project Y  increases the marginal cost of the firm 
from c  to yc  ( yc c ). However, project Y  generates an innovation with probability
s (0 1)s  . If an innovation occurs, the firm can reduce its marginal cost to .xc  The 
magnitude of s  is the same between the firms. In addition, information about s  is 
common knowledge. Therefore, innovation project Y  can reduce both the 
environmental burden and its marginal cost with probability s  and can reduce the 
environmental burden and increase the marginal cost with probability .1 s  
Innovation Y, therefore, shares the characteristics of the innovation in existing studies 
on the Porter hypothesis. On the other hand, innovation project X  does not have any 
uncertainty. Accordingly, if a firm chooses investment project ,X  then the firm 
definitely can reduce its marginal cost. To implement investment project X  or ,Y  
firms have to incur investment cost ( 0)k   where the cost is the same between X  
and Y. Further, project N  means the status quo, that is, the firm does not implement 
any investment project. 
Based on the above setting, we make a comparison of firms’ behavior between an 
unregulated and a regulated situation. Particularly, our focus is to analyze the 
conditions that both firms select innovation ,Y  since it is considered to have a strong 
relationship with the realization of the Porter hypothesis. 
 
3. Unregulated game 
 First, we investigate the situation in which environmental regulation is not 
introduced. Each firm chooses from three projects in the Bertrand competition. In the 
initial situation, both firms obtain 0 profits because the goods of both firms cannot be 
differentiated and their marginal costs are same.  
If both firms choose innovation project X  (or N ), then their marginal costs are 
always equivalent. In this case, the profits of both firms are 0. If their marginal costs 
are not equivalent, then the market is monopolized by the firm with lower marginal cost. 
For example, if firm 1 chooses X  and firm 2 chooses Y and the innovation does not 
occur in Y, then firm 1’s marginal cost is xc  and firm 2’s is .yc  In the result, firm 1 
monopolizes the market and earns monopoly profit 
M i . This monopoly profit 
corresponds to the marginal cost .xc  Next, 
m ( )m M   means the monopoly profit 
that corresponds to the marginal cost .c  m  accrues if firm i  chooses Y  and the 
innovation is not generated. If the latter is true, then firm i ’s marginal cost is yc  and 
the other firm chooses N  with its marginal cost being .c  In this case, the market is 
monopolized by the latter firm.  
If the Nash equilibrium of this game is ( 1' , 2 ' ) ( , )firm s choice firm s choice Y Y  
and the expected profit is positive, then the market without environmental regulation 
could realize the win-win situation. This situation negates the Porter hypothesis 
because both firms increase their expected profit and reduce environmental burden 
without environmental regulations. In this case, the expected profit of firm i  is 
described as follows. 
(1 )YY MiE s s k                            (1) 
  Table 1 shows the payoff matrix of this game. Equation (1) is always smaller than 
.)1( ks M   (1 ) Ms k   is the expected profit of firm i  when it chooses innovation 
X  and the other firm chooses innovation Y. Thus, the Nash equilibria of this game are 
as followsii. 
(Firm1’s choice, Firm 2’s choice)= ( , ), ( , )N X X N   
 
  As a result, in the case of the unregulated game, both firms do not reduce their 
environmental burden. Therefore, the innovation project Y  that provides the 
reduction of the environmental burden and cost reducing innovation is not selected.  
  In addition, even assuming ,1s  innovation Y  surely brings about a reduction in 
environmental burden; thus, reducing marginal cost ( , )Y Y is not a Nash equilibrium. 
The probability of 1s   means that both firms’ marginal costs coincide at xc  and both 
firms acquire the expected profit .k  
 
Table 1：unregulated game 
             Firm 2 
Firm 
1 
 X  Y         N  
X  ,k k   
(1 ) ,Ms k
k
 

 ,
0
M k   
Y  
,
(1 ) M
k
s k

 
 (1 ) ,
(1 )
M
M
s s k
s s k


 
 
 ,
(1 )
M
m
s k
s




 
N  
0,
M k 
 (1 ) ,
m
M
s
s k




 
0,0  
 
3. Regulated game 
  Next, we analyze the market with environmental regulation. The environmental 
regulation is as follows. The government imposes an environmental lump-sum tax or a 
basic penalty ( 0)t 　  on an environmentally unfriendly firm. Environmentally 
unfriendly means emitting a high level of pollution, that is, .HD  If a firm’s emission is 
,HD  then this firm has to pay an environmental tax t  and if the emission level is ,LD
then an environmental tax is not imposed. The payoff matrix of this game is in table 2.  
  In this game, ( , )Y Y  can be a Nash equilibrium. The condition is the following. 
 
(1 ) max{(1 ) ,(1 ) }M M ms s k s k t s t                      (2) 
 From (2), we obtain the following conditions.  
 
    
2(1 ) (1 )( )M M ms t s k                if (1 ) (1 )M ms k t s t        (3) 
    (1 )( ) (1 )( )M m M mk s s t s k             if (1 ) (1 )M ms k t s t        (4) 
 
From (3), the conditions that ( , )Y Y  is a Nash equilibrium are investment cost k  
having an upper bound, that is, (1 )( )M mk s      and the level of environmental 
tax having a lower bound, that is, .)1( 2 ts M    The existence of the lower bound on 
the tax level means that the Porter hypothesis might be appropriate since it claims that 
to realize the win-win situation, the environmental regulation should be strictly 
enforced. Similarly, (4) means the existence of a lower bound on the environmental tax 
level, that is, .))(1( tssk mM    Table 2 depicts the payoff matrix of a regulated 
game. In Figure 1, ( , )Y Y  is Nash equilibrium in areas A and B. Area A is derived from 
inequality (3) and B is derived from (4). 
As a result, the introduction of an environmental regulation can redirect the firm’s 
innovation choices to those that are more environmentally friendly. On the other hand, 
an increase in the expected profits is not guaranteed by the introduction of an 
environmental regulationiii. 
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 Figure 1: The area of (Y, Y) is N-E 
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4. Different investment cost  
In this section, we extend the previous analysis. In previous sections, the investment 
cost to implement innovation X  and Y  is k  with it being the same between 
innovations X  and .Y  Thus, we introduce the different investment costs between X  
and .Y  We then postulate the following situation. To implement innovation X  (or Y ), 
firms have to incur investment costs xk  (or yk ) where .0, xy kk  
  In this case, ( , )Y Y  can be the Nash equilibrium of the unregulated game. Table 3 
depicts the payoff matrix of this game. The conditions are the following.  
(1 ) max{(1 ) , (1 ) }M M my xs s k s k s                        (5) 
From (5), we acquire the following conditions. 
                       
2(1 ) Mx yk k s           if (1 )( )
M m
xs k                 (6) 
(1 )( )M m ys s k          if (1 )( )
M m
xs k                 (7) 
 Figure 2 illustrates the areas where ( , )Y Y  is the Nash equilibrium. The conditions 
that these areas exist are given by the following in equality. 
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Equation (8) means that to realize this Nash equilibrium, the probability of the 
innovation in innovation Y has the lower bound .
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     Table 3：unregulated game (different investment costs) 
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Figure 2: The area of ( , )Y Y  is Nash Equilibrium 
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 Next, we analyze the case where an environmental regulation is introduced in this 
game. The introduction of an environmental tax t  shifts the ⑤  upward if 
(1 )( )M m xs k     and shifts the ⑥ upward if (1 )( )
M m
xs k     in Figure 2. As a 
result, the existence of an environmental regulation will extend the area where (Y, Y) is 
a Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
○D  
5. Concluding Remarks 
 This study theoretically analyzed the choice of firms’ innovation and the manner in 
which an environmental regulation affects their innovation choices. Many studies 
analyze the relationship between environmental regulations and innovations, treating 
an innovation as given. However, our analysis demonstrated that if firms have various 
innovation projects, they do not always choose an innovation that existing studies have 
employed. Even when the probability of a innovation is 1 , in the absence of 
environmental regulations, the environmentally friendly and cost reducing innovations 
are not necessarily the choice of the other firm. 
 Additionally, our conclusion partially supports the Porter hypothesis. Environmental 
regulations would generate or extend the area where an environmentally friendly and 
cost reducing (stochastically) innovation is selected. On the other hand, we are not sure 
that the firms’ choices increase their expected profits under environmental regulations 
because they do not always increase by the reduction of their marginal costs.  
 Finally, our analysis was limited to a homogeneous good and Bertrand competition. A 
comparison with Cournot competition and the introduction of an innovation that 
conducts product differentiation could be subjects of future research. 
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i We postulate .0 k
M  
ii We restrict the analysis to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
iii Our main focus is to demonstrate the conditions under which ( , )Y Y  configure the 
Nash equilibrium. Therefore, this study does not address the issue of whether ( , )Y Y  is 
a unique Nash equilibrium of this game. 
